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UNITY AND PLURALISM IN CONTRACT 
LAW 
Nathan Oman* 
CONTRACT THEORY. By Stephen A. Smith. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 2004. Pp. xxvi, 450. $35. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a cliche of contemporary legal scholarship that, in the last few 
decades, the study of law has witnessed a vast proliferation of 
competing theoretical approaches. The old faith in the careful honing 
of doctrinal concepts and the essential usefulness of legal analysis has 
given way to a cacophony of competing theoretical sects. 1 Economists, 
moral philosophers, sociologists, historians, and others have stepped 
forward to offer the insights of this or that discipline as a new and 
superior path to legal enlightenment. Perhaps nowhere has this cliche 
been truer than in the realm of contracts scholarship, where, for a 
generation, the competing disciplinary approaches have been 
energetically proselytizing for their chosen theories. Hence, modern 
legal scholarship abounds with economic, philosophical, and 
sociological theories of contract law. 
Most contracts scholars take one of two basic approaches. On one 
side stand those who, while acknowledging the usefulness of the new 
theoretical tools, remain unconverted to any of them. With lawyerly 
pragmatism, they remain skeptical of unifying theoretical enterprises. 
Human experience and the law are too complex for academic 
reductionism, they argue, and "a good gray compromise" of 
competing principles and policies 2 is the best that we can hope for. On 
* Associate, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, Washington, DC. B.A. 1999, Brigham 
Young; J.D. 2003, Harvard. - Ed. This article does not represent the views of my employer 
or any of its clients. I would like to thank Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold, Robert Frommer, 
Jody Kraus, Val Ricks, Eric Andersen, Gordon Smith, Ashlie Warnick, and Kaimi Wenger 
for their help with this project. The standard disclaimers apply. As always, I thank Heather. 
1. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987) (chronicling the rise of interdisciplinary 
approaches to legal scholarship and the decline of doctrinalism). 
2 See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 701 n.14 (1990). 
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the other side are those who declare that "theory works."3 The 
problem with pragmatism, they assert, is that ultimately it fails to 
provide either illumination or concrete conclusions. We are left with 
little more than a series of ad hoc ipse dixits lacking coherence or 
justification. In contrast, rigorous theory of one sort or another offers 
the promise of real understanding. Obviously, both portraits are 
overdrawn, and individual scholars fall at different points along the 
spectrum between them. Nevertheless, the tension between 
pragmatism and theory explicitly or implicitly pervades much of 
contemporary contracts scholarship. 
Into this discussion comes Contract Theory by Stephen A. Smith.4 
Published as part of Oxford University Press's Clarendon Law Series, 
Smith's book, despite its aggressively boring title, is a fascinating and 
important contribution to the current debates. Part textbook and part 
original analysis, Smith surveys most of the prominent contemporary 
theories of contract law and ultimately offers a detailed argument in 
favor of a unified theory built around the moral force of promising. 5 
Smith is a legal philosopher by training, and he has a philosopher's 
faith in theory. Hence, Contract Theory squarely challenges the 
pragmatic approach to contract law. Smith admits that "[i]n the 
end . . .  because there is little consensus as to the best theory of 
contract, studying contract theory mainly entails learning about 
competing theories" (p. viii). Nevertheless, he clearly believes one 
may hope for greater unity and precision than "a good gray 
compromise," and one of Contract Theory's contributions is Smith's 
sustained discussion and defense of a set of criteria for winnowing out 
defective theories. 
Ultimately, however, Smith's laudable desire for theoretical rigor 
ignores the possibility the pragmatic approach to contract law 
suggests: a principled reconciliation of competing approaches. Smith 
argues for an essentially unified theory. He seeks to defend his 
promissory approach by arguing for the wholesale rejection of 
competing alternatives, most notably reliance and efficiency theories. 
The "good gray compromise" school of thought, however, 
acknowledges that such outright dismissals are problematic. Most 
people have powerful intuitions that autonomy, efficiency, and 
corrective justice should all play important roles in our understanding 
of contract law. "Theory works" partisans rightly respond that such 
intuitions, by themselves, fail to provide us any way to coherently 
3. See ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY s. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY (3d ed. 
2004). 
4. Professor of Law, McGill University. 
5. Briefly stated, this is the theory that certain promises to perform some action create a 
moral obligation to act, for the breach of which the law should provide a remedy. 
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integrate those competing values. Smith's work graphically illustrates 
this quandary. His quest for theoretical unity leads him to make a 
series of problematic arguments dismissing efficiency theories. Indeed, 
in his drive to ground contract law in a single normative principle, he 
comes to the startling conclusion that many of what we think of as the 
core rules of the subject - such as those governing breach and 
damages - are not actually part of contract law at all. The difficulties 
Smith faces suggest that, rather than trying to unite all of contract law 
under a single normative principle, theorists should turn their 
attention toward providing a principled way of integrating competing 
approaches to contract in a single theory. As an example, I will 
present my strategy for reconciling the values of autonomy and 
efficiency into a single theory, while neither dismissing one approach 
nor falling into the trap of making ad hoc choices between them. 
This Review proceeds as follows. I begin, in Part II by placing 
Smith's book in the context of the contemporary scholarly literature 
on contracts and detailing some of its main contributions. Next, in Part 
III, I turn to Smith's attempt to offer a theoretically unified view of 
contract law, outlining the arguments he uses to establish this unity 
and explaining why they are ultimately unpersuasive. Finally, in Part 
IV, I suggest that, in place of theoretical unity, contracts theorists 
should turn their attention to the possibility of a "principled 
pluralism" and put forward a set of arguments suggesting how this 
might be accomplished. 
II. CONTRACT THEOR Y AND THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The past three decades have seen a succession of ambitious books 
on the theory of contract law. Patrick Atiyah's magisterial The Rise 
and Fall of Freedom of Contract told a story of common law judges 
who labored, in vain, to construct a theory of contract law organized 
solely around the idea of party autonomy.6 Grant Gilmore told a 
pithier, American version of this same tale in The Death of Contract, 
where he suggested that contract's days were numbered and it would 
soon subside into tort, which Gilmore insisted was the residual form of 
civil liability. 7 In response to these attacks, Charles Fried penned 
Contract as Promise, which insisted that a consistent theory of contract 
based on party autonomy is possible and provides the best 
interpretation of legal doctrine. 8 More recently, Michael Trebilcock 
has written The Limits of Freedom of Contract, which surveyed a 
6. P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). 
7. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974). 
8. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981). 
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variety of problems in contract law and brought to bear the insights of 
twenty years of industrious law and economics scholarship. 9 
Smith's work is the latest volume in this conversation. Unlike the 
others, Smith sets out to provide a more or less comprehensive survey 
of contract theory. He is mainly successful, although his performance 
is not without faults. His treatment of economic theories is ultimately 
unpersuasive. In addition, there are some rather unaccountable 
absences in the book. For instance, Smith pays virtually no attention 
to the work of James Gordley and others seeking to articulate a neo­
Aristotelian theory of contract.10 Still, a student or scholar looking for 
a compendium of recent work on the philosophy of contract law is not 
likely to find a more detailed overview than Contract Theory. It is, 
however, much more than a mere summary of contemporary contract 
scholarship. It also offers a spirited defense of a much maligned theory 
in American jurisprudence: contract as promise. 
Promissory theories of contract have not been popular in 
American scholarship. Under the influence first of Lon Fuller11 and 
later of Grant Gilmore, 12 many American scholars have found reliance 
to be a more attractive basis than promise for explaining and justifying 
contract law. The promissory theory has been associated with the 
discredited "classical" view of contract, and for many scholars there is 
something suspiciously Willistonian about it. On this view, it is a 
theoretical mirage from which Corbin and section ninety of the 
Restatement have delivered legal thought. It is not without its 
partisans, most prominently Charles Fried.1 3  Yet Fried's theory has 
gained few followers and even theorists that share the libertarian 
sensibilities behind Contract as Promise have criticized it. 1 4  Smith, on 
the other hand, concludes that a promissory theory provides the best 
9. MICHAEL s. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1993). See also 
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 
(1991), and ROBERT A HILLAM, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW (1997); both also 
deserve honorable mention. 
10. See GORDLEY, supra note 9 (setting forth Gordley's argument that modern contract 
doctrine is best understood using the theories of late-scholastic philosophers); see also James 
Bernard Murphy, Equality in Exchange, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 85 (2002) (arguing for an 
Aristotelian theory of contract law). Smith does discuss Gordley's work in a single footnote 
in which he says: "[W]hile I cannot defend the claim here, it is suggested that insofar as 
Gordley's theory is meant to provide a positive j ustification for contractual obligations 
(rather than only a reason for limiting their scope), it disaggregates into a mixture of 
utilitarian and rights-based justifications." P. 52 n.16. 
11. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 
YALE L.J. 52 (1936). 
12 See GILMORE, supra note 7. 
13. See FRIED, supra note 8. 
14. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems With Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1022 (1992). 
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account of contract law. He thus offers a useful restatement and 
deepening of the argument in favor of contract as promise. 
According to Smith, the most telling normative objection to 
promissory theories rests on the harm principle. Famously formulated 
by John Stuart Mill, the harm principle states that in a liberal society, 
the machinery of the state can be legitimately used to prevent harm to 
others but should not be used to enforce moral obligations whose 
violation do not result in harm.15 Most promissory theories 
conceptualize promise breaking as an immoral act. The harm 
principle, however, suggests that the immorality of promise breaking is 
not a sufficient reason to mandate government enforcement of that 
promise. Smith's solution to this problem is what he calls an intrinsic 
view of promising (p. 74). Promises, he asserts, are intrinsically 
valuable because they create a special relationship between the 
promisor and the promisee. Promise breaking harms this special 
relationship by taking something intrinsically valuable to the promisee 
(the promise) and destroying it.16 The advantage of such a view is that 
it transforms contract law from a species of mere morality 
enforcement into the forestalling of harm to another. Thus the harm 
principle is neatly sidestepped and can actually be invoked as a reason 
for enforcing promises. 
Much of Contract Theory is taken up with a detailed application of 
various theories to different doctrinal areas.17 He admits there are 
some areas where promissory theories offer only an incomplete and, in 
some sense, unsatisfactory account of the law.18 He nevertheless 
concludes that his modified promissory theory offers the best 
interpretation of contract law. Hence, Smith's contribution to 
promissory theory is twofold: First, he offers a subtle new argument 
about promising that purports to avoid a key objection that has 
dogged such theories in the past. Second, he examines the application 
15. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859). 
16. In stark contrast to Smith's theory, Dori Kimel has recently argued that the legal 
enforcement of promises has precisely the opposite effect to the one posited by Smith. 
According to Kimel, legal enforcement actually undermines the trust that makes promising a 
valuable activity. See Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 473 (2001); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Promises, Trust, and 
Contract Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 25 (2002) (responding to Kimel's arguments). 
17. See pp. 167-208 ("Establishing Agreement: The Law of Offer and Acceptance"); pp. 
209-244 ("The Kinds of Agreements that are Enforced: Formalities, Intention to Create 
Legal Relations, Consideration, and Estoppel"); pp. 245-268 ("The Kinds of Agreements not 
Enforced: Substantive Limitations on Enforceability"); pp. 269-314 ("The Content of the 
Contract: Interpreting and Implying Terms"); pp. 315-375 ("Excuses for Non-performance: 
Duress, Unconscionability, Mistake, Misrepresentation, Frustration, and Discharge for 
Breach"); pp. 376-386 ("Breach of Contract: The Puzzle of Strict Liability"); pp. 387-431 
("Remedies for Breach"). 
18. See infra Part IIl.C.3 (discussing Smith's admission that the concept of promising 
cannot account for certain doctrinal areas). 
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of promissory theories across a greater range of doctrinal topics and in 
greater depth than any prior legal philosopher. 
Ill. UNIFYING CONTRACT LAW 
The theoretical heart of Contract Theory, however, does not lie in 
its usefulness as a survey or as a restatement of the promise theory. 
Indeed, Smith's defense of promise rests less on his arguments about 
the function and importance of promising than on his approach to 
dealing with theories. The core of Smith's argument is a set of criteria 
for judging between competing theories of contract. These criteria 
offer an intriguing framework for dealing with the central issue in the 
philosophy of contract law: the brute fact of theoretical pluralism. 
Contract theory suffers from an embarrassment of riches. Roughly 
speaking there are two main camps, one of which contains two 
significant subcamps. On one side sit the economic theories, which not 
surprisingly argue that contract law should be guided by notions of 
efficiency and welfare maximization. On the other side sit what Smith 
labels "rights-based" theories. These come in essentially two different 
flavors: those that see contract as properly focusing on compensating 
parties who detrimentally relied on the promises of others, and those 
that see contract as properly focusing on promising itself as an 
independent source of legal obligation.1 9  Both the reliance and 
promissory theories (also called "autonomy theories") share an 
essentially ex post perspective. They both see contract law primarily as 
a way of compensating a disappointed promisee for harm to some 
entitlement. Their disagreement lies in how they account for the 
genesis and scope of the promisee's protected interest. Both, however, 
share the basic paradigm of corrective justice. In contrast, efficiency 
theorists take an essentially ex ante approach. Rather than focusing on 
the problems of entitlement and compensation, they look to the 
incentives that contract rules create for rational actors and then argue 
that we should adopt rules that generate economically efficient 
outcomes. The problem lies in the apparent incommensurability of 
these two approaches. Jody Kraus aptly summarizes the issue, writing: 
As normative theories, economic contract theories would seem to be 
logically incompatible with autonomy contract theories for the same 
reason that consequentialist moral theories are logically incompatible 
with deontological moral theories: The former claim that moral 
19. One could also add so-called transfer theories, which conceptualize contracts as the 
voluntary alienation of rights. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contracts, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE THEORY OF 
CONTRACT LAW 118 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). Smith discusses these theories at some 
length, but ultimately dismisses them as unpersuasive because of their inability to explain 
how future performance can be explained in terms of a right held in the present. See 
generally pp. 97-103. 
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justification is solely a function of consequences, while the latter claim 
that moral justification is independent of moral consequences. 20 
Without some way of choosing between these theories or otherwise 
reconciling them, contract theory is deeply incoherent. It lacks the 
ability to generate consistent normative or descriptive theories of the 
law.21 
A. A Theory About Theories 
The philosophy of contract law thus faces a thorny problem of 
normative pluralism. How are we to choose between competing 
approaches? To his credit, Smith tackles this problem head on. The 
first forty pages of Contract Theory consists of a careful elaboration of 
criteria for choosing between competing approaches. Smith takes an 
essentially interpretivist approach to the question. The purpose of 
contract theory, on this view, is not to provide us first with an ideal 
normative framework and only then offer concrete rules of law that 
flow from that framework. Rather, one takes contract law as it 
currently exists and seeks an explanation that renders it as coherent 
and intelligible as possible. According to Smith, this internal approach 
generates four concrete criteria by which to judge theories: fit, 
coherence, morality, and transparency. These criteria then form the 
heart of Smith's argument for rejecting efficiency theories of contract 
in favor of the rights-based approach. 
1. Fit and Coherence 
The concepts of fit and coherence are pretty straightforward. In 
order for a normative theory to make current law intelligible, it must 
generate concrete rules that more or less track current law. Suppose 
one was looking for a theory that rendered the Thirteenth 
Amendment's prohibition on slavery intelligible. Obviously, one could 
not use Aristotle's argument for the natural inferiority of some people 
and the justice of enslaving them to provide such a theory.22 The legal 
rules Aristotle's theory suggest are simply too at odds with the rule set 
forth in the Thirteenth Amendment. By the same token, a theory that 
20. Jody Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical 
Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 420 (2001); see also Kaimipono David Wenger & 
David A. Hoffman, Nu/lificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (2003) (discussing the 
conflict between economic and moral theories in the context of tort law). 
21. By "descriptive theory," I do not mean sociological type descriptions of legal 
practice or even traditional doctrinal accounts of contract law. Rather, I am referring to the 
process of interpreting the practice of contract law and rendering it internally intelligible. 
Accordingly, in this context, "interpretive" serves as a synonym for "descriptive." 
22. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. VII; ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, 
Bk. I, ch. ii-vii. 
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implied that contract law ought to provide a cause of action only 
against those who maliciously breach their agreements is too wide of 
the current law to render it intelligible.23 Coherence is even simpler. A 
theory that generates contradictory conclusions obviously suffers from 
a basic problem of consistency. Smith also suggests that consistency 
requires that a theory rendering a particular body of law intelligible 
must account for the fact it is thought of as a distinct body of law. 
"More specifically," he writes, "to explain why contract law merits the 
title 'contract law', a good theory must show that most of the core 
elements of contract law can be traced to, or are closely related to, a 
single principle" (p. 13). 
2. Morality 
Smith subscribes to Joseph Raz's claim that the concept of law, as 
an analytic matter, always consists of a claim to authority. 24 Part of 
what we mean when we use the term "law" is the idea that one has an 
obligation to obey the law. This authoritative aspect of law is part of 
what differentiates its commands from those of a highway robber. 
Hence, any theory of law must also be in some sense a moral theory. It 
must purport at least to explain why the law is authoritative. This does 
not require that it necessarily be a good moral theory. Smith 
differentiates three different versions of the morality criterion. Under 
a very weak version, the theory must simply make an identifiable 
moral claim, even if it is clearly incorrect. For example, the 
Nuremberg laws passed by the Third Reich rested on theories of racial 
superiority and the legitimacy of anti-Semitism that are analytically 
identifiable as moral claims even if those claims are not themselves 
morally defensible. A middling version of the criterion asserts that a 
legal theory must contain a moral theory that is both analytically 
identifiable as a moral claim and also within the range of reasonable 
moral positions, even if ultimately mistaken. Finally, the strongest 
version of the moral criterion requires that the moral component of a 
legal theory be ethically correct. 
3. Transparency 
The transparency criterion has to do with the sorts of arguments 
judges offer when they expound the law. The claim is that judicial 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 252(2) (1979) ("When performance 
of a duty under contract is due, any non-performance is a breach." (emphasis added)). 
24. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY 
OF LAW AND POLITICS 199 (1994) ("I will assume that necessarily law, every legal system 
which is in force anywhere, has de facto authority. That entails that the law either claims that 
it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it, or both."). 
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opm10ns are part of the legal data to be rendered intelligible. 
According to Smith: 
The transparency criterion evaluates contract theories according to how 
well they account for what may be called the 'legal' or 'internal' 
explanation of contract law . ... That law is understood from the inside as 
transparent is clear: law-makers, and in particular judges, give public 
reasons for acting as they do and those reasons are presented as their 
real reasons. The report of a legal decision is not mere window dressing; 
it is meant to explain why the plaintiff did or did not win. (pp. 24-25) 
Hence, any successful theory must fit not only the rules in the common 
law of contracts but also the arguments judges use to justify their 
decisions under those rules. For example, if judges consistently claim 
that damage awards in contract cases exist to compensate successful 
plaintiffs for harms they have suffered, then a successful theory must 
account for the fact not only that the law awards damages but also for 
the fact that damages are conceptualized as compensation. 
B. Dismissing Efficiency Theories 
While Smith analyzes efficiency theories under all four criteria, the 
transparency criterion proves decisive in his effort to reject those 
theories. To be sure, he is quite sympathetic to the traditional anti­
utilitarian arguments that have been marshaled as moral objections to 
efficiency as a normative criterion. 25 On the other hand, Smith 
concedes that for an interpretive theory, even ultimately valid moral 
objections may be irrelevant. In order to satisfy the morality criterion 
in its least demanding form, all that is necessary is that efficiency 
theories make identifiably normative claims, which they clearly do. 
Smith even seems willing to concede that efficiency theories are 
among those that could be endorsed by reasonable people. Only under 
the strong version of the moral criterion would efficiency theories, 
according to Smith, suffer from a serious moral objection (p. 132). 
Broadly speaking, he concludes that the fit objections to efficiency 
theories are not compelling because he believes that economic analysis 
is so indeterminate that one could construct plausible efficiency 
arguments in favor of most important rules of contract law (p. 125). 
In contrast, Smith believes the transparency criterion provides a 
reason for rejecting efficiency theories regardless of one's opinion as 
to their moral defensibility or the strength of the analytic connection 
between law and morality. According to Smith, "arguably [the] most 
25. See pp. 127-32; cf RONALD DWORKIN, Is Wealth a Value, in A MATIER OF 
PRINCIPLE 237 (1985) (arguing that wealth maximization is a normatively unattractive 
criterion for the law). For a more sophisticated set of arguments against efficiency norms 
than those offered by either Smith or Dworkin, see JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, 
AND THE LAW 67-153 (1998). 
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important objection to efficiency theories of contract law is that they 
regard contract law as non-transparent, as hiding its own foundations" 
(p. 132). Smith acknowledges that judges sometimes consider the 
effects their rulings will have, but insists this reasoning is 
inconsequential. Mainly, when judges and litigants make arguments in 
contract cases, he asserts, they do not claim that damages are 
necessary to deter future actors. Rather, they argue about what the 
parties are entitled to as a matter of justice. In other words, legal 
reasoning is always an ex post attempt to establish what rights litigants 
are entitled to, while economic reasoning is always an ex ante attempt 
to gauge future reactions to incentives created now. Accordingly, 
Smith concludes that "[t]here is virtually no point of contact .. . 
between the legal explanation and the efficiency based explanation" 
(p. 133). It is not that judges and lawyers employ less sophisticated 
versions of the arguments made by law and economics scholars. 
Rather, their arguments are of a fundamentally different kind. 
This disjunction between legal arguments and economic 
arguments, according to Smith, leaves efficiency theorists still 
interested in offering an interpretive view of contract law with one of 
two untenable reactions to the transparency argument. First, they can 
argue that the arguments made by lawyers and judges are basically 
insincere, a mere screen that obfuscates the real reasons for their 
decisions. Smith dismisses this possibility by arguing that "to 
successfully explain a self-reflective human practice, such as the law, 
one of the things that must be explained - that must be made 
intelligible - is how that practice understands itself" (p. 134). Hence, 
the smoke-screen vision of legal reasoning fails as an interpretive 
theory precisely because it fails to offer any explanation of a key 
phenomenon. The second alternative for efficiency theorists, 
according to Smith, is to assert that the law pursues efficiency, without 
legal actors knowing about it, through some invisible-hand or 
evolutionary mechanism. The problem with this approach, according 
to Smith, is that it still fails to explain why legal actors choose to justify 
rules in the way they do. Furthermore, given the sophistication of 
judges and lawyers, Smith finds it implausible that they could be 
systematically mistaken about the nature of the enterprise in which 
they are engaged. 
C. The Failure of the Effort to Dismiss Efficiency Theories 
Economic theorists could respond to Smith's arguments in a 
number of ways. Some of them would no doubt simply brush aside the 
transparency objection as meaningless. They would argue that they 
are concerned with finding the optimal rules for contract law as it 
should be, rather than finding some interpretation of contract law as it 
is. In a sense, this response simply concedes Smith's point. These 
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theorists would agree with him that their theories are simply about 
different things. Even within the interpretive criteria that Smith sets 
up, however, it is by no means obvious that economic theories can be 
so easily dismissed. First, Smith's transparency argument conflates two 
aspects of ex post reasoning. Once these two aspects are untangled, 
the import of the ubiquitous ex post reasoning one sees in judicial 
opinions becomes less telling than Smith believes. Second, judicial 
reasoning is considerably less hostile to economic arguments than 
Smith suggests. Finally, rights-based theories underdetermine the 
content of certain rules that economic theories account for quite well. 
As a result of this problem, Smith is forced into making the rather 
implausible claim that certain well-established features of contract 
doctrine, such as the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale,26 are not actually 
part of contract law at all. 
1. The Two Forms of Ex Post Reasoning 
Smith is correct to observe that much of judicial reasoning is 
backward looking and focuses on the question of who is entitled to 
what as a matter of pre-existing rights. It hardly follows from this fact, 
however, that the basis of the law is the enforcement of pre-existing 
moral rights. Judges are primarily concerned with determining the 
rights the law confers on particular parties. The source judges use to 
determine these rights is generally not some body of pre-existing 
moral entitlements, but rather the pre-existing body of law. When a 
judge rules that A has no good breach of contract claim against B 
because their agreement was not memorialized as the Statute of 
Frauds requires, she is making a statement about the contours of A 
and B's legal rights. She is not, however, necessarily making a 
statement about the moral foundations of the Statute of Frauds. 
There is no reason that efficiency theorists must reject the notion 
that judges should decide cases according to pre-existing rules, nor do 
they question the basic belief that someone who holds a legal 
entitlement has a legal right to that entitlement. Economic theories of 
law are not attacks on the rule of law per se. Rather, they are 
explanations for why the law takes one shape rather than another. For 
example, one might argue that the expectation measure of damages 
should be chosen over the reliance measure because it provides proper 
incentives for disappointed parties to bring suits and for potential 
breachers to take the optimal level of precautions to avoid those suits. 
There is nothing about the ex ante shape of this argument, however, 
that precludes one from also affirming that the disappointed promisee 
of a breached contract has a legal right to her expectation damages. In 
26. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
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short, one may believe that ex ante arguments provide the best 
account for particular legal rules while also believing that ex post 
analysis should be used to determine whether a particular person has a 
particular entitlement under those rules. 
Judicial decisions are mainly concerned more with the application 
of pre-existing law to concrete facts than with the application of 
normative theories to particular legal rules. Hence, it should not 
surprise us to find that most legal discussions center around arguments 
over the scope of pre-existing rights. That, after all, is what the parties 
to a lawsuit are litigating. It is important to remember, however, that 
these are pre-existing legal rights. It hardly follows from the fact that 
judges are mainly concerned with these pre-existing legal rights that 
that the law itself is best understood as enforcing pre-existing moral 
rights. The preponderance of judicial cases are not about the 
normative foundations of the law but about the application of the law 
- regardless of its normative foundations - to particular cases. This 
is what accounts for the preponderance of ex post arguments in the 
judicial opinions. Tellingly, when judges do discuss the normative 
foundations of the law, they use ex ante arguments with greater 
frequency than Smith suggests. 
2. The Transparency of Economic Reasoning 
It is simply not true that common law judges eschew the ex ante 
perspective as completely as Smith implies. For example, in criticizing 
the California Supreme Court's decision to adopt a "soft" version of 
the parol evidence rule,27 Judge Alex Kozinski wrote: 
[The California Supreme Court's decision] casts a long shadow of 
uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed under the law 
of California. As this case illustrates, even when the transaction is very 
sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if it was 
negotiated with the aid of counsel, even if it results in contract language 
that is devoid of ambiguity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be 
avoided if one party has a strong enough motive for challenging the 
contract. While this rule creates much business for lawyers and an 
occasional windfall for clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for 
most litigants and clogs already overburdened courts.28 
Note that Judge Kozinski's objections take an almost exclusively ex 
ante approach, resting on the incentives that the rule creates for 
litigation and the increased transaction costs it places on parties as 
they attempt vainly to bargain around it. This kind of argument is not 
confined to contemporary judges whose judicial opinions have been 
27. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 
(Cal. 1969) (Traynor, J.). 
28. Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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somehow tainted by law and economics scholarship. Consider Judge 
Danaher's dissent in the famous case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co. 29 In that case, Judge Skelly Wright held that a cross­
collateralization clause in a sales contract was potentially 
unconscionable because of unequal bargaining power. In his dissent, 
Judge Danaher reasoned: 
There are many aspects of public policy here involved. What is a luxury 
to some may seem an outright necessity to others. Is public oversight to 
be required for the expenditures of relief funds? A washing machine, 
e.g., in the hands of a relief client might become a fruitful source of 
income. Many relief clients may well need credit, and certain business 
establishments will take long chances on the sale of items, expecting their 
pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the 
risk.30 
Judge Danaher's defense of the traditional rule that courts will not 
examine the adequacy of consideration is based on explicitly ex ante 
reasoning. There is no discussion of the ex post rights of the defendant 
in the case, but rather an analysis of how the incentives the rule 
creates will impact the availability of credit and capital for the very 
poor. 
Nor is such reasoning confined to recent judicial decisions. In 1854, 
Baron Alderson issued his opinion in the famous case of Hadley v. 
Baxendale.31 The op1mon stated a two-part rule governing 
consequential damages in breach of contract cases. The first part of 
the rule is that a plaintiff can recover only those damages that were 
reasonably foreseeable to the breaching promisor. The second part of 
the rule is that where the plaintiff has specifically communicated to the 
defendant that certain consequences will flow from a failure to 
perform, the defendant becomes liable for those consequences, even if 
they otherwise would not be reasonably foreseeable. Baron Alderson 
justified the rule thus: 
[I]f these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party 
breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have 
had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise 
generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special 
circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special 
circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for 
the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; 
and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them.32 
29. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
30. Id. at 450 (Danaher, J., dissenting). 
31. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
32. Id. at 151. 
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Note that Baron Alderson's ex ante reasoning here is quite subtle. 
Simple efficiency theories of damages tend to focus on how to induce 
efficient performance and breach of obligations.33 Baron Alderson, 
however, employs what Richard Craswell has called "second-· 
generation efficiency," which asks what effect rules have on the 
contracts that are negotiated. 34 Thus, Baron Alderson justifies the 
specially communicated rule in terms of the incentives it creates for 
the parties at the time of negotiation. To be sure, some of the language 
of justice remains, but the argument nevertheless explicitly looks to 
the incentives to negotiate that the rule creates. 
3. Underdetermination and Line Drawing 
The rule in Hadley v. Baxendale illustrates the third problem with 
Smith's attempt to dismiss economic theories: the promissory theory 
he espouses underdetermines certain rules. Economic theorists can 
neatly explain the holding in the case in terms of incentives and 
information. 35 When parties enter a contract they have imperfect 
information about the other party's situation, which can result in 
inefficiencies. For example, it is efficient for the promisor to take any 
precaution to avoid breach of his promise that is less than the value of 
that promise to the promisee. At the time of contracting, however, the 
promisor may not know the value of the promise to the promisee. 
Indeed, during negotiations the promisee has incentives to conceal the 
true value of the potential promise in order to get a better price. As a 
result, the promisor may take inefficiently few precautions to avoid 
breach. As Baron Alderson suggested, however, limiting the 
promisee's damages to those that are reasonably foreseeable creates 
incentives for parties to negotiate around this problem. Because the 
promisee cannot recover damages for losses that are in effect invisible 
to the promisor at the time of breach, this rule gives the promisee an 
incentive to disclose this information when negotiating. Once the 
hidden information is communicated, the promisor has an incentive to 
take the efficient level of precautions to avoid breach because he will 
be liable for the full amount of the promisee's damages. 
Although he does not address the economic justifications offered 
for the rule in Hadley, Smith is generally critical of economic theories 
of damages. His main objection is that no single rule can create 
33. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 117-20 (4th ed. 1992) 
(discussing the theory of efficient breach). 
34. See Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in THE 
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW 19 (Peter Benson ed., 2002). 
35. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101-04 (1989) (discussing the holding in 
Hadley as a penalty default rule). 
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efficient incentives for all parties to a contract. Hence, while 
expectation damages may create efficient incentives for parties 
choosing whether or not to breach their contracts, they create 
inefficient incentives for those choosing the extent to which they 
should rely on the promises of others. 36 
Smith himself, however, does not provide a satisfying account of 
the rule in Hadley. The rights-based approach, he argues, implies that 
contract damages are explainable in terms of corrective justice. "This 
explanation is consistent, in broad terms," he argues, "with the 
principle that victims of breach have a right to compensatory 
damages" (p. 412). Beyond this, however, Smith seems to deny that his 
account of contractual obligation has any concrete implications for 
damages rules. Rather, he argues that it is unnecessary for a theory of 
contract law to explain the remoteness rule in Hadley (or any other 
rule regarding contract damages). "[T]he answers [to these 
questions]," he argues, "will not tell us anything special about 
contractual obligations" (p. 427). He offers two reasons for why this is 
so. 
Smith's first claim is that the rule in contract damages does not 
actually exist. Rather, he denies that there is any distinction between 
the foreseeability or remoteness rule applied in torts37 and the rule 
applied in contracts, arguing that any apparent differences can be 
accounted for in terms of different factual circumstances (pp. 426-27). 
While he cites an English case in support of his position,38 as a 
doctrinal matter his claim is at least doubtful. 39 Smith's doctrinal 
reformulation, however, is less important than his second reason. 
36. Pp. 410-11. Smith does not, however, deny that it is logically possible to come up 
with a socially efficient measure of damages. He simply believes that it is virtually impossible 
to identify it: 
Id. 
[I)n theory it might well be that the expectation measure is produces the most efficient 
aggregate behavior (if it could be proved, say, that the breach decision overwhelms all 
others). But making the necessary calculation is complex to say the least. I doubt that such a 
calculation has or even could be attempted. As was true [for other economic issues) the 
relevant quantitative data is not available. 
37. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (stating the remoteness 
rule in tort); cf Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854) (stating the remoteness 
rule in contract). 
38. H Parson (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co., 1978 All. E.R. 525 (C.A.), Q.B 
791, cited at p. 427 n.54. 
39. For example, it is a well established rule that generally speaking one cannot recover 
for emotional distress as a result of a breach of contract. See, e.g., Rubin v. Matthews 
Internment Corp., 503 A.2d 694 (Me. 1986) (emotional distress damages generally not 
recoverable in contract); Moffet v. Kan. City Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 244 P.2d 228 (Kan. 
1952) (same). In contrast, such damages are not too remote in the tort context. See, e.g., 
Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961) (allowing recovery in tort for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress); Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 240 P.2d 282 (Cal. 
1952) (same). 
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Smith's second, and more philosophically interesting, justification 
for not accounting for the rule in Hadley is that it is not actually a rule 
of contract law at all and hence need not be explained by a complete 
theory of contract. Rather, he argues, "[t]he justification and meaning 
of remoteness is a general question for the law of obligations" (p. 427). 
Smith makes this move for at least two reasons. First, he argues, 
consistent with his view of promising as creating a uniquely valuable 
entitlement where none existed before, that the infringement of a 
contractual right through breach is analogous to a misappropriation of 
- or negligent damage to - property (p. 104). Just as these wrongs 
are not considered part of property law, Smith claims that "non­
performance should not be regarded as part of contract law" (p. 104). 
Second, and more tellingly, he claims that "[a]s for remedial rules, the 
promissory account [of contract] has nothing special to say about how 
remedies for breach of contract should be classified. "40 This sort of 
shifting of the boundaries of contract law to save the promissory 
theory from embarrassment has been done before. Charles Fried, for 
example, denied that contract law had anything to do with those legal 
default rules whose content could not be determined by his promise 
principle. 41 
There is a deus ex machina quality to this argument. The 
fundamental problem is that Smith and Fried do not provide any 
arguments for defining the scope of contract law independent of the 
promise theory itself. Without such a theory-independent argument, a 
vicious circularity arises, with the theory of explanation being used to 
define what is to be explained and then citing its ability to explain this 
limited domain as evidence of the theory's success. To take an 
extreme example, it is as though one set out to explain the phenomena 
of "games," and first argued that "games" were those social 
interactions between two people over an eight-by-eight board with 
thirty-two pieces that conform to the rules of chess. Having made this 
move, the ability of the rules of chess to explain these particular social 
interactions would then be taken as evidence that the rules of chess 
constitute a successful theory of games! 
IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF PRINCIPLED PLURALISM 
The apparent failure of Smith's project of unification does not 
mean that we are left inevitably to "the good gray compromise of 
competing principles." It should, however, lead those who believe that 
"theory works" to re-examine an important insight provided by theory 
40. P. 104; cf Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). 
41. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 69. 
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skeptics. The lure of pragmatism in contract law lies in the fact that 
most lawyers and judges have powerful intuitions that there are 
several legitimate values at stake in the law. Autonomy, welfare, and 
justice are all in play, and most people believe all of these things 
matter to some degree. If, as Contract Theory suggests, a unified 
theory resting on an exclusive commitment to a single normative 
principle is unlikely to succeed, theorists ought to turn their attention 
to whether it is possible to integrate these competing values in a 
principled way. Indeed, in the absence of a compelling unified theory, 
the alternative to a principled integration would be the perpetual 
exercise in ad hoc balancing that the "theory works" partisans wish to 
avoid. What follows sketches an approach to such a principled 
integration. Articulating a complete theory of contract law is beyond 
the scope of this Review. I do believe, however, that a successful 
theory will ultimately need to take the form of something like this: 
Contract law ought to be understood in terms of a two-tiered ordering 
of autonomy and efficiency. Both values ought to be pursued, but 
where they conflict, autonomy should act as a "trump" value. 
A. Contract Law and the Priority of Liberty 
John Rawls has argued that the first principle of justice is that 
"each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of 
equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for 
others. " 42 For Rawls, the principle of equal liberty enjoys priority over 
other concerns. Hence, while one may limit basic liberties in the name 
of liberty itself, one cannot limit basic liberties in order to secure other 
goals, such as distributive justice or increased levels of welfare. Rawls 
offers a variety of arguments for this privileged position for liberty, 43 
many of which have been subject to criticism, 44 but the most 
compelling argument rests on the notion of self-determination.45 
Human beings in a liberal society have competing conceptions about 
what constitutes the ultimate good or where ultimate values lie. In 
ordering such a society, it follows that the most important concern 
should be to preserve the ability of people to choose and pursue a 
conception of the good. This is what the priority of liberty allows them 
to do. Its priority is justified precisely because it serves, in a sense, to 
42. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (rev. ed. 1999). 
43. See, e.g., id. at 130-39. 
44. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls' Theory of 
Justice, 70 J. OF PHIL. 245 (1973); H.L.A. Hart, Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority, in 
READING RAWLS 230 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975). 
45. My interpretation of Rawls' priority principle follows Robert S. Taylor, Raw/s's 
Defense of the Priority of Liberty: A Kantian Reconstruction, 31 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 246 
(2003). 
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protect citizens' access to ultimate values by guaranteeing them a 
sphere in which to work out their own conceptions of the good. 
This argument is useful for contract theory because it prioritizes 
liberty without necessarily committing itself to any outright hostility 
toward competing values. For example, it is still permissible to pursue 
increases in social welfare under this theory, so long as such pursuits 
do not threaten equal liberties. Hence, we seem to have at least an 
initially plausible reason for choosing efficiency in one sphere (those 
areas where liberty is not implicated) while placing emphasis on 
autonomy in another sphere (those areas where liberty conflicts with 
other concerns). The theory's value lies in its ability to provide 
principled reasons for using autonomy as a criterion some of the time 
and using efficiency at other times. This tracks the intuition at the 
heart of the pragmatic approach by acknowledging that apparently 
competing values both have legitimate claims. It does not commit us, 
however, to a "good gray compromise of competing values," but 
rather provides us reasons for consistently ordering those values. 
Rawls, like most political philosophers, has little interest in private 
law and apparently even less knowledge of the intricate rules with 
which a legal theorist must cope. Hence, A Theory of Justice doesn't 
provide any concrete discussion of contract law other than to affirm 
that "freedom of contract as understood by the doctrine of laissez­
faire [is] not [a] basic [liberty]. "46 There are no arguments as to why 
this is so, and one suspects that Rawls is simply eager to demonstrate 
that his concept of the priority of liberty is different from the more 
libertarian liberalism of the nineteenth century. As I shall argue 
below, however, this is an imaginary bogey man, as there is no a priori 
reason to believe that including freedom of contract in the catalog of 
basic liberties leads inevitably to the laissez-faire capitalism Rawls 
clearly rejects. Other than this unhelpful swipe at freedom of contract, 
it looks as though the Rawl's priority of liberty, despite its apparent 
theoretical usefulness, is at too high a level of abstraction to be 
jurisprudentially useful. As Charles Fried observed in a slightly 
different context: 
The picture· I have ... is of philosophy proposing an elaborate structure 
of arguments and considerations which descend from on high but stop 
some twenty feet above the ground. It is the peculiar task of law to 
complete this structure of ideals and values, to bring it down to earth; to 
complete it so that it is seated firmly and concretely and shelters real 
human beings against the storms of passion and conflict.47 
46. RAWLS, supra note 42, at 54. 
47. Charles Fried, The Artificial Reason of the Law or: What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. 
REV. 35, 57 (1981). 
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At this point what is needed is a concept that will act as a bridge from 
the abstraction of the priority of liberty to the "thickets of the law." 48 
Promissory theories are useful here because some share the same 
liberal assumptions as Rawls's argument. For example, Fried also 
envisions a society where citizens pursue differing visions of the good 
life. Indeed, what Fried calls the "first principle of liberal political 
morality" reads very much like Rawls's priority principle: "[W]hatever 
we accomplish and however that accomplishment is judged, morality 
requires that we respect the person and property of others, leaving 
them free to make their lives as we are left free to make ours. This is 
the liberal ideal." 49 
Promising is valuable precisely because it allows us to enlist the 
help of others in pursuing our vision of the good without 
impermissibly imposing our will on them. We can enlist their help 
because promising allows us to commit ourselves morally in ways that 
invite the trust and confidence of others. "To renege is to abuse a 
confidence he [i.e. the promisor] was free to invite or not, and which 
he intentionally did invite. To abuse that confidence now is like (but 
only like) lying: the abuse of a shared social institutions that is 
intended to invoke the bonds of trust."50 Such an abuse, according to 
Fried, violates the liberal ideal. Obviously, the validity of this 
argument is controversial. It does, however, suggest that providing a 
remedy for the breach of a promise can be traced back to the priority 
of equal liberty. Such a remedy protects people from the violation of 
the rights that they gained when others promised to perform on their 
behalf. To do otherwise would be to allow a promisor to treat a 
promisee as a mere means to his own ends. It would deny in effect that 
the disappointed promisee is a being entitled to choose his own vision 
of the good free from the illegitimate manipulation of others. 51 Hence, 
promising provides a way of enlarging the scope of the freedom 
available to all, and contract law, which ultimately provides a remedy 
for the breach of promises, protects the rights created by that enlarged 
sphere of liberty. 
I am not offering a brief for Fried's theory or other promissory 
theories. I find them ultimately unpersuasive for many of the same 
reasons I find Smith's theory unpersuasive. Fried's ambition is 
theoretical unity; therefore, he, like Smith, must deny the claims of 
competing approaches and stretch the concept of promising in 
implausible ways in order to account for much of contract doctrine. 
48. See ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 67 (1962). 
49. See FRIED, supra note 8, at 7. 
50. Id. at 16. 
51. Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 35 (James 
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ'g Co., 1981) (1785). 
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Fried is useful not because his is a complete theory of contract, but 
because he provides a link between the lexical ordering provided by 
Rawls and something close enough to contract law that we can use it 
to provide the beginnings of a legal theory. Fortunately the priority 
(rather than the exclusivity) of liberty relieves us of the need to trace 
all rules of contract law to a single source. We can have pluralism 
without incoherence. 
The priority of liberty has some concrete implications for contract 
law. It suggests that, by and large, promises ought to be enforced in 
some way. It also suggests that the scope of obligations should at least 
track the intentions of promisors. Translated into doctrinal terms, this 
means that autonomy ought to provide the primary basis for 
specifying the rules of contract formation and interpretation. This 
does not, however, necessarily mean that there should be no 
limitations on freedom of contract. Contrary to the fears of Rawls 
himself, acknowledging the basic liberty to contract does not 
automatically commit one to the dreaded "doctrine of laissez-faire." It 
does mean, however, that limitations on contractual freedom, such as 
those in the doctrines of consideration, capacity, and 
unconscionability, need to be justified in terms of preserving equal 
liberty. The priority of liberty does not mean that there are no 
restrictions of personal freedom. It simply means that those 
restrictions must be justified with reference to the concept of liberty 
rather than with reference to welfare, distributive justice, or some 
other value. 
For example, Lon Fuller's famous claim that the doctrine of 
consideration serves to channel the intention of parties and ensure 
that legal obligations represent deliberate decisions suggests that 
consideration can be plausibly seen as a way of ensuring that contract 
enforcement more closely tracks the deliberate exercise of liberty.52 In 
other words, the restriction on contractual freedom represented by the 
doctrine of consideration can be justified in terms of liberty itself. 
Contractual disabilities based on infancy or diminished capacity 
likewise serve to ensure that legal obligations arise from truly 
autonomous decision making. Similar arguments could be employed 
to justify various forms of unconscionability, particularly so-called 
procedural unconscionability.53 All of these arguments are open to 
dispute. The important thing is to see that the priority of liberty 
provides a context in which these debates can occur, as well as giving 
us some sense of what sorts of criteria we should use. A visceral 
52. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941). 
53. See Dori Kimel, Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract, 21 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 473 (2001) (arguing that limitations on the freedom of contract can serve to 
advance a perfection notion of liberty). 
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hostility to laissez-faire, however, does not constitute a good objection 
to the priority of liberty since the principle contains resources for 
justifying restrictions on freedom of contract. 
Liberty alone, however, is not a sufficiently powerful concept to 
specify all of the rules of contract law. In particular, much of 
contractual doctrine is specifically concerned with how to resolve 
contract disputes in the absence of any overt choice on the parties' 
part. For those committed to a unified theory of contract, this poses a 
serious embarrassment to autonomy-based approaches.s 4 If one 
conceptualizes liberty as a superior value, however, rather than as an 
exclusive value, there is no objection to employing welfare 
considerations in specifying rules where liberty is not directly 
implicated. Thorny issues remain, of course, about the scope of 
liberty's domain. In particular, determining the precise scope of what 
has or hasn't been decided by the parties can be difficult. The mere 
fact of contractual silence cannot necessarily be taken as absence of 
any intention on a particular point. Communication is inevitably 
nested in a social context that carries a host of implicit assumptions 
that must hold for any explicit communication to be intelligible. Lon 
Fuller provided a typically pithy example: If an absent-minded 
professor walks out of his office, he may not consciously be thinking 
that the floor of the hallway will be there, but the floor's presence is 
necessarily an implicit assumption of his actions.ss In the same way, 
contracting parties implicitly assume much about their transactions 
that must be taken into consideration to give force to their intentions. 
As Fried put it: 
It is a truism in the philosophy of language that in interpreting a person's 
words we are not guessing at the hidden but determined content of some 
list of meanings in the speaker's head. Rather our concerns particularize, 
render concrete, inchoate meanings . . .. Yet at some point it becomes 
necessary to say not that this is what the speaker meant but rather that 
this is what the speaker might have meant had he thought of it. s6 
Once even the implicit intentions of the parties are exhausted, 
however, the value of liberty no longer has a dog in the fight. 57 There 
is no objection at this point to employing arguments derived from 
54. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of 
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989). 
55. See LON L. FULLER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 666 (1st ed. 1947) ("The absent-minded 
professor stepping from his office into the hall as he reads a book 'assumes' that the floor of 
the hall will be there to receive him. His conduct is conditioned and directed by this 
assumption, even though the possibility that the floor has been removed does not 'occur' to 
him, that is, is not present in his conscious mental processes."). 
56. FRIED, supra note 8, at 60 (footnote omitted). 
57. Cf Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687 (Jules Coleman et al. eds., 2002). 
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considerations of welfare, and efficiency arguments can enter our 
theory of contract with full force. Indeed, one of the great theoretical 
virtues of efficiency is that it can provide arguments that yield 
relatively determinate answers in precisely those areas where 
autonomy theories have difficulty providing concrete conclusions. 
When faced with a well-established rule like that in Hadley v. 
Baxendale, Smith was forced to resort to a variety of ultimately 
unpersuasive stratagems to avoid the embarrassment created by the 
fact that the promissory theory fails to yield any determinate answers 
on the question. On the other hand, the economic theory of an 
information-eliciting penalty default accounts for the rule quite nicely. 
There are, of course, objections that can be put forward against 
employing efficiency or welfare arguments to fill out a theory of 
contract. One might argue that while liberty properly enjoys a superior 
position, where it is not implicated one should turn to considerations 
of fairness or distributive justice rather than efficiency. Efficiency, 
after all, is indifferent to who enjoys the benefits of society's enlarged 
pie. On the other hand, we may have important ethical reasons for 
pref erring some particular group - such as the poor or the virtuous. 
The problem with this approach is that so long as there is substantial 
contractual freedom, such attempts at distributive justice are likely to 
be ineffective because, generally speaking, parties will contract away 
from such rules if they are economically inefficient. 5 8  Of course, one 
might be able to achieve such goals through contract law by limiting 
the ability of parties to bargain away from the desired distributive 
outcomes. The problem with this solution is that it violates the priority 
of liberty. Remember, within this theory liberty may only be limited to 
secure expanded liberty for all, not in the interest of other concerns 
such as efficiency or distributive justice. It does not follow, of course, 
that one cannot pursue such other concerns; one simply cannot pursue 
them through contract law. Hence, one might be able to employ the 
taxing and spending power to distribute wealth to deserving 
constituencies without violating the theory of contract I am proposing 
here. 
The idea that distributive justice is best pursued through transfer 
payments is a common argument among law and economics scholars. 5 9  
It is important to realize, however, that the economic reasons offered 
for this preference are quite different from the ones I offer above. The 
economic argument asserts that distributively attractive but inefficient 
rules should be eschewed in favor of taxing and spending because 
58. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
59. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 
119-124 (2d ed. 1989) (arguing that equity is best pursued through taxing and transfer 
payments rather than legal rules governing the interactions between private parties). 
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adopting efficient rules coupled with transfer payments increases 
aggregate welfare while achieving the same distributive goals. The 
argument from the priority of liberty, however, does not hinge on the 
maximization of aggregate welfare. Indeed, if it did then one would 
not be able to prefer liberty over efficiency when the two conflicted. 
Rather, the argument against employing fairness or distributive justice 
as a secondary value in place of efficiency flows from the priority of 
liberty itself, because practically speaking such goals can only be 
pursued in contract law by violating the priority of liberty. 
B. The Vertical Integration Strategy 
The approach sketched in the previous paragraphs is no more than 
an outline of a theory of contract. There are obvious gaps and 
plausible objections. It does, however, provide a useful model of how 
one should approach the problem of theoretical pluralism. Ultimately, 
the argument above is an example of what Jody Kraus has called "the 
vertical integration strategy." The vertical integration strategy deals 
with the problem of conflict between consequential and rights-based 
theories by ranking values hierarchically. In place of pragmatism it 
"contemplate[ s] . . . that both approaches may be combined as 
logically distinct components of a united theory."60 There are several 
ways this might be done. One could argue, for example, that one 
approach is foundational to the other approach. Daniel Farber, for 
example, has proposed an argument along these lines, claiming that in 
the context of contracts governing commercial transactions, a respect 
for autonomy leads for a rule aimed at maximizing efficiency. 61 
Alternatively, one could argue for the lexical superiority of one value 
over another value. My argument takes this form. I do not claim that 
efficiency can be derived from respect for autonomy or vice versa. 
Rather, I simply offer an argument for why when the two values 
conflict, one should be chosen over the other. 
Regardless of the form taken, the vertical integration strategy 
offers the best hope for a satisfying and coherent theory of contract. 
So long as philosophers of law focus on a quest for a single master 
value that explains all of contract law, their arguments are likely to run 
into the same problems that, despite his ingenuity and subtlety, afflict 
60. Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical 
Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420, 422 (2001). 
61. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and The Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54 (Jody S. 
Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000). Like the theory that I offer in the text, Farber draws on 
the philosophy of John Rawls in making his arguments. Farber, however, focuses on a 
different part of Rawls' work, arguing that behind Rawls' famous veil of ignorance parties in 
the Original Position would choose a regime of commercial law that aimed at the 
maximization of efficiency. 
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Smith's Contract Theory. The vertical integration strategy, in contrast, 
responds to the pragmatic insight, acknowledging that competing 
values of autonomy, efficiency, and justice all have their place in 
contract law, without falling into the trap of ad hoc balancing between 
them. 6 2  
V. CONCLUSION 
Stephen Smith has produced an impressive and important book. It 
provides a detailed and nearly comprehensive introduction to 
contemporary theories of contract law. Perhaps more importantly, it 
makes important original contributions both to the theory of 
promising and contracts and to the larger issue of how scholars should 
adjudicate between the claims of competing theories of the law. 
Despite these considerable virtues, however, Smith's book is flawed by 
the fact that it leaves largely unconsidered an important possibility for 
contract theory: a principled integration of competing normative 
approaches. To illustrate this, I offer an argument based on Rawls's 
principle of the priority of liberty as one way in which autonomy and 
efficiency could be held together in a single theory. My argument is an 
example of the vertical integration strategy, which I believe is 
ultimately the most fruitful direction in which philosophers of contract 
law could move. 
62. Kraus offers a second strategy for reconciling autonomy and efficiency, which he 
labels the "horizontal independence" strategy. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract 
Law: Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 Soc. POL. & LEGAL 
PHIL. 385, 390-422 (2002). The heart of this argument is the claim that autonomy and 
efficiency theories are actually theories about different things. Thus, Kraus offers the not 
entirely plausible argument that efficiency theorists are primarily concerned with explaining 
the outcomes of cases, while autonomy theorists are primarily concerned with explaining the 
arguments that judges use. See generally Kraus, supra note 57. The problem with this 
approach is at least twofold. First, it is open to the same objection that can be leveled against 
Smith's anti-economic transparency argument, namely that judges actually do employ ex 
ante reasoning quite regularly in their opinions. Second, and more importantly, the 
"horizontal independence" strategy does not respond to the pragmatic insight, namely the 
powerful intuition that as a normative matter autonomy, efficiency, and other values are all 
important. When economic theories are reduced to intellectual constructs for predicting case 
outcomes they lose their normative force and become little more than instrumentally useful 
descriptive assumptions. Cf ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 
74-79 (1988) (discussing instrumentalism in economics). In other words, the horizontal 
independence strategy, as formulated by Kraus, does not acknowledge the intuition that 
efficiency is a normatively - as opposed to purely descriptively - important concept. 
